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Pollen in the Wind: Economic and Legal
Consequences When Nature
Responds to Man
Kristen M. Zahnow *
I. INTRODUCTION
For hundreds of years, farmers have engaged in conventional breeding
techniques by crossing the traits of individual plants with favorable physio-
logical traits of others., Within the past few decades, however, developments
in the field of molecular biology have revolutionized the agricultural indus-
try.2 Today, scientists can easily introduce a foreign gene into a plant genome
in order to confer advantages, such as drought or weed resistance.3 The re-
sulting plants are known as "transgenic" plants, which simply means that a
gene from one organism has been transferred to another organism.4 Scientists
create transgenic plants to study plant physiology and to confer physiological
and economic advantages specific to agriculture, particularly large-scale crop
production.5
As the reader can imagine, there is inherent tension between biotechnol-
ogy companies, the primary creators of transgenic plants, who seek a return
on their costly investment, and farmers, who seek to grow their crops in the
most cost-effective manner. This Comment will address this tension and ex-
plain the issues that arise with two aspects of plant reproduction, namely,
self-pollination and cross-pollination. This Comment will also explain the
way in which courts have overlooked fundamental aspects of plant biology,
misunderstood the complexities of genetic engineering, and failed to appreci-
ate the significant ecological risks that transgenic plants pose to the
environment.
* Kristen M. Zahnow is a Juris Doctor Candidate at Southern Methodist Univer-
sity Dedman School of Law. She received her bachelor's degree in plant biol-
ogy from the University of Oklahoma and worked as a research assistant in the
molecular biology laboratory of Dr. Ben F. Holt m. She would like to thank
her friends Krystal and Anne for their endless support and encouragement.
1. History of Plant Breeding, DEP'T OF SOIL AND CROP SCIS. AT COLo. STATE
UNIv. (2004), http://cls.casa.colostate.edu/transgeniccrops/history.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2015).
2. Id.
3. What are Transgenic Plants?, DEP'T OF SOIL AND CROP SCIS. AT COLo. STATE
UNIv. (2004), http://cls.casa.colostate.edu/transgeniccrops/history.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2015).
4. Id.
5. See NEIL A. CAMPBELL ET AL., BIOLOGY 816-17 (8th ed. 2008).
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II. SELF-POLLINATION
A. Transgenic Plants
Monsanto is the largest manufacturer of transgenic crop seed.6 Mon-
santo is particularly known for its Roundup weed management solutions and
the Roundup Ready soybean.7 Roundup Ready technology provides a tre-
mendous advantage to farmers, as weeds can compete with and kill crops.
Monsanto's Roundup Ready seed contains a transgene that gives each plant
resistance to glyphosate, the active chemical in Monsanto's Roundup herbi-
cide that inhibits protein synthesis.8 When the farmer plants the Roundup
Ready seed, the farmer can then spray the entire field with the Roundup
herbicide containing glyphosate, resulting in the death of the weeds while not
harming the crop.
Monsanto licenses its transgenic seed directly to farmers and permits
third-party seed companies to insert the transgene into their own seeds, pro-
vided that the seed companies pay a royalty to Monsanto.9 Monsanto also
requires each farmer to sign a standard-form, limited-use license known as
the "Technology Agreement."O The terms of the Technology Agreement re-
quire that the farmer:
(1) [U]se the seed containing Monsanto gene technologies for planting
a commercial crop only in a single season;
(2) [N]ot supply any of this seed to any other person or entity for
planting;
(3) [N]ot save any crop produced from this seed for replanting, or sup-
ply saved seed to anyone for replanting; and
(4) [N]ot use this seed or provide it to anyone for crop breeding, re-
search, generation of herbicide registration data, or seed
production. I
A frequently litigated phrase of Monsanto's Technology Agreement re-
lates to the "use" of the seed. Absent from the agreement, however, is an
express prohibition against "making" transgenic seed. This is presumably
due in part to the fact that "making" seed is simply inherent to the commer-
cial production and subsequent sale of the crop. At least in the case of soy-
6. Who Owns Nature? Corporate Power and the Final Frontier in the Com-
modification of Life, ETC GROUP 1, 11 (2008).
7. See MONSANTO Co., http://www.soybeans.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2015)
(Monsanto owns and uses the domain name soybeans.com to educate consum-
ers and farmers about its products and patented technologies).
8. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman (Bowman 1), 657 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
9. Id. at 1344.
10. Id. at 1344-45.
11. Id. (emphasis added).
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bean seed, the farmer harvests and cultivates mature soybean plants.12 In
other words, when the farmer sells the crop, the farmer sells the first-genera-
tion soybean plants along with the second-generation soybean seeds.
There is one exception to Monsanto's restriction on the "use" of the
seed for a single commercial crop: the farmer can sell the second-generation
seed to a grain elevator.1 3 Monsanto allows grain elevators, under a separate
license, to sell second-generation seeds as commodity seeds for the sole pur-
pose of consumption.14 Because farmers routinely sell their second-genera-
tion transgenic seeds to the grain elevators, "commodity" seeds contain a mix
of transgenic and non-transgenic seeds.'5 As a result, some farmers purchase
and re-plant commodity seeds for use in their commercial crops. Monsanto
subsequently sues these farmers, alleging that they infringe the patent di-
rected to the Roundup Ready transgene.16
B. Protection for Transgenic Plants
Those who create novel plant species may protect their plants (including
the underlying genetically modified plant genes) with a plant or utility patent,
issued by the Patent and Trademark Office, or a certificate of plant variety
protection, issued by the Plant Variety Protection Office, a subset of the De-
partment of Agriculture.17 Courts have held that these forms of protection are
not mutually exclusive-that is, a biotechnology company could, for exam-
ple, protect a plant species by a plant patent and a plant variety protection
certificate.18 Biotechnology companies may also enforce their rights under
contract law through the use of contracts and licenses. Monsanto is arguably
the most well-known example of a company that has utilized both the patent
and contract laws to protect their transgenic plants.19 Monsanto has also ag-
gressively enforced its patent rights against farmers.20
12. See Growing Soybeans, N.C. SOYBEAN PRODUCERS Ass'N (Nov. 1, 2015),
http://ncsoy.org/media-resources/growing-soybeans.
13. Bowman 1, 657 F.3d at 1345.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1343.
16. See id. at 1341.
17. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (2012); Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2321-2372 (2012) (amended 1994).
18. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143-44
(2001).
19. See Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (noting that Monsanto has brought approximately 144
infringement suits and settled 700 other disputes between 1997 and 2010).
20. Id.
1872015]
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i. Plant Patent Act
Prior to the enactment of the Plant Patent Act, plants were not believed
to be patentable subject matter for two reasons: (1) plants constituted "prod-
ucts of nature," a well-known exception to patentability;21 and (2) inventors
would be unable to satisfy the "written description" requirement as some
physical traits, such as scent and color, were difficult to quantify.22 Congress,
however, recognized that biotechnology companies needed an incentive to
invest in plant biotechnology and sought to make the United States agricul-
tural industry more competitive.23
In 1930, Congress enacted the Plant Patent Act,24 and in doing so, the
United States was the first country to grant patent rights for plant varieties.25
To address the dual concerns about patentability, Congress developed a less
stringent "written description" requirement for plant patents and stipulated
that a plant was not a "product of nature." Rather, breeding novel plant vari-
eties was an act "in aid of nature."26
The Plant Patent Act has three limitations, among others, that are rele-
vant and important to this Comment. First, Congress sought to provide an
incentive to plant breeders to develop new plants27 while at the same time
ensuring that wild, uncultivated plants would remain unpatentable. This ex-
clusion was based on the theory that an individual who merely discovers a
novel plant by happenstance does not deserve a patent monopoly.28 The leg-
islative history expressly states that new plants are patentable when "man
[has] 'controll[ed] and direct[ed] the natural processes [to] produce[ ] a de-
sired result.' "29 Courts have similarly required "human creative effort."30 If
this were the only limitation, biotechnology companies would surely satisfy
21. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
22. Imazio Nursery v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
23. Id.
24. Plant Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2012) ("Whoever invents or discovers and
asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated
sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propa-
gated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent there-
fore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
25. Imazio Nursery, 69 F.3d at 1563.
26. Id.
27. Id. (The purpose of the Plant Patent Act is to "afford agriculture, so far as
practicable, the same opportunity to participate in the benefits of the patent
system as had been given to industry, and thus assist in placing agriculture on a
basis of economic equality with industry.") (citing S. REP. No. 71-315, at 3
(1930)).
28. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 1352 (citing H.R. REP. No. 7 1-1129, at 7 (1930)).
30. Id. at 1351.
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this requirement, as the introduction of a transgene to the plant genome is a
laborious process requiring expensive lab equipment and expertise in plant
molecular biology.31
Second, Congress limited protection to novel plant varieties developed
by asexual reproduction.32 The House Committee Report explains that the
purpose of the plant patent statute is to give to the inventor "an exclusive
right to propagate that plant by asexual reproduction; that is, by grafting,
budding, cuttings, layering, division, and the like, but not by seeds."33 It is
unlikely, then, that a biotechnology company like Monsanto would seek
plant patent protection, because the majority of crops reproduce sexually by
seed. In other words, should Monsanto seek to protect a plant variety by a
plant patent, Monsanto would only be able to protect the single parent plant
and its asexually reproduced progeny and would therefore be unable to en-
force its rights against farmers who primarily propagate their crop by plant-
ing seed.
Third, the plant patent allows the patentee only one claim to the individ-
ual plant variety.34 Because biotechnology companies benefit most from pro-
tection of both the transgene itself and plants containing the transgene, it
follows that Monsanto would not invest in a plant patent that offered virtu-
ally no protection to the underlying technology. Based on the foregoing limi-
tations, it should be no surprise that biotechnology companies-or at least
those heavily invested in the agricultural industry-rarely protect their plants
under the Plant Patent Act.35
ii. Plant Variety Protection Act
With the enactment of the Plant Variety Protection Act in 1970, Con-
gress broadened the scope of protection for plants and sought to provide sup-
31. See generally Monsanto Co. v. Bowman (Bowman l), 657 F.3d 1341, 1343-44
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing, in technical language, the patents Monsanto has
developed).
32. See Asexual Reproduction, BERKELEY UNIV., http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/
glossary/gloss6/asexual.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2015) (Asexual reproduction
is a method of production in which the progeny arises from a single parent
rather than two parents-meaning that the progeny has the same genetic
makeup as its parent. Rather than producing seed, plants that reproduce asexu-
ally produce rhizomes, stolons, tubers, and bulbs. Plants that are capable of
asexual reproduction can also be propagated through human manipulation, i.e.,
through grafting, cuttings, and the like.).
33. In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834, 837 (Ct. Cust. App. 1940) (citing H.R. REP. No.
7 1-1129, at 7 (1930)) (emphasis added).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2012).
35. See Tempe Smith, Going to Seed?: Using Monsanto As A Case Study to Ex-
amine the Patent and Antitrust Implications of the Sale and Use of Genetically
Modified Seeds, 61 ALA. L. REv. 629, 633-34 (201.0).
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plementary patent-like protection for sexually reproduced plants.36 To receive
a certificate of plant variety protection, the "breeder" must satisfy criteria
similar to that of the patent laws; that is, the plant must be new, distinct,
uniform, and stable.37 Unique to the Plant Variety Protection Act are the re-
search exemption, which gives scientists the right to use transgenic plants in
their research,38 and the farmer's exemption, which gives farmers the right to
save seed with certain limitations.39 Moreover, the Department of Agricul-
ture, rather than the Patent and Trademark Office, administers the certificate
of plant variety protection.40
To comply with the International Union for the Protection of New Plant
Varieties (an international treaty), Congress amended the Plant Variety Pro-
tection Act in 1994.41 The 1994 amendments had three significant implica-
tions for the agricultural biotechnology industry. First, Congress removed the
prohibition against first-generation hybrid protection, thereby allowing com-
panies to protect the first generation of plants from which subsequent genera-
tions will derive.42 Second, Congress broadened the scope of infringement to
include an "essentially derived" variety.43 Finally, the farmer's exemption no
longer allows farmers to save seed for "reproductive purposes," increasing
the likelihood that farmers will be found liable for patent infringement.44 The
research and farmer's exemptions are the most important distinctions be-
tween a certificate of plant variety protection and a patent.
Although a Plant Variety Protection Act certificate protects sexually re-
produced plants and crop seed, it has its disadvantages. More than 70 coun-
tries contracted for the International Union's Protection of New Plant
36. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2012) (emphasis added) ("The breeder of any sexually
reproduced or tuber propagated plant variety who has so reproduced the vari-
ety, or the successor in interest of the breeder, shall be entitled to plant variety
protection for the variety, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
chapter"); see also H.R. REP. No. 91-1605, §144, at 5095-96 (1970) (noting
the purpose of the Plant Variety Protection Act was "[t]o encourage the devel-
opment of novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants and to make them
available to the public, providing protection available to those who breed, de-
velop, or discover them, and thereby promoting progress in agriculture in the
public interest.").
37. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a).
38. Id. § 2544.
39. Id. § 2543.
40. Id. § 2321.
41. Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1993, S. 1406, 103rd Cong.
(1993) (enacted).
42. Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349, sec.
3, § 42, 108 Stat. 3136, 3138-39 (1994).
43. Id. sec. 9, § 111(4)(c), 108 Stat. 3136, 3142.
44. Id. sec. 10, § 113, 108 Stat. 3136, 3142.
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Varieties.45 However, the International Union does not have the established
and widespread recognition that the patent system has, and as a result, it may
be more difficult for American inventors to obtain reciprocity rights in for-
eign countries.46 Moreover, like the plant patent, the certificate of plant vari-
ety protection protects only a single plant variety, whereas a utility patent
allows the inventor to claim both the individual variety and other varieties
containing the transgene. 47 It appears that the certificate provides more pro-
tection to biotechnology companies through the protection of sexually repro-
ducing plants, but it still fails to provide the kind of protection afforded by
the traditional utility patent (discussed below).
iii. Patent Act
Because Congress created a discrete system of plant patent protection
through the Plant Patent Act in 1930 for asexually reproduced plants and
later the Plant Variety Protection Act in 1970 for sexually reproduced plants,
it was unclear whether, in addition to already established avenues of protec-
tion, an inventor could also obtain a utility patent for a novel plant. In 1980,
the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty upheld a utility patent di-
rected toward a living, synthetic microorganism.48 The Court reasoned that
the microorganism was created in the laboratory through extensive genetic
manipulation and, therefore, constituted either a "manufacture" or "composi-
tion of matter."4 9 Following this decision, the Patent Office began issuing
utility patents towards plants and plant material.50
It was not until 2001 that the Supreme Court held that an individual can
obtain a utility patent for a plant.51 In J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred Intern, Inc., the Supreme Court held that sexually reproducing plants
were patentable subject matter under Section 101 of the Patent Statute.52 The
Court also found that plant patents and certificates of plant variety protection
45. WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties > UPOV Convention,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?
treaty_id=27 (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
46. Id.
47. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142
(2001).
48. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
49. Id. at 309-10.
50. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 144-45.
51. Id. at 145.
52. Id.; see also § 35 U.S.C. §101 (2012) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title.").
2015] 191
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are not the exclusive means of protection.53 That is, an inventor can obtain
both a patent and a certificate of plant variety protection for the same plant
variety.54
The Supreme Court also discussed at length the backdrop against which
the Plant Patent Act was enacted.55 In 1930, the drafters of the Act had not
contemplated the kind of genetic engineering that is now commonplace.56
Even though Congress had originally believed that plants developed through
rudimentary breeding techniques were not patentable under Section 101, the
Court did not preclude protection, especially considering the kind of plant
genetic manipulation that occurs today.57 Also, in contrast to today, there
were no large or developed markets for seed.58 As such, Congress did not
intend the Plant Patent Act to incentivize seed companies by granting protec-
tion to their sexually reproduced plants but rather to protect asexually repro-
duced plants-the kind of plants that were commonly and widely developed
at that time.59
The holding in J.E.M. Ag Supply was an important decision for biotech-
nology companies. As previously mentioned, it allowed biotechnology com-
panies to secure broader protection for their transgenic plants through utility
patents. 60 The Patent Act does not differentiate between asexually and sexu-
ally reproduced plants; it relates broadly to the subject matter.6 1 In contrast to
the plant patent, the utility patent allows the patentee to include multiple
claims covering the transgene, plant, seed, and virtually any other plant mat-
ter containing the transgene. 62 The utility patent does not provide a farmer's
or research exemption, and as a result, the patentee's rights are much more
extensive. The only apparent drawback is that the patentee must satisfy
heightened non-obviousness and enablement requirements under the Patent
Act.63 The utility patent generally gives broader protection than the plant
patent, and therefore, the utility patent is the preferred and most popular type
of plant protection used in the biotechnology industry.64
53. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 132.
54. Id. at 132-33.
55. Id. at 135-38.
56. See id. at 134-135.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 135-36.
60. Id. at 145.
61. See id. at 135-37.
62. Id. at 140.
63. See id. at 131.
64. David R. Nicholson, Agricultural Biotechnology and Genetically-Modified
Foods: Will the Developing World Bite?, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 15 (2003).
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C. Enforcement of Patent Rights
The Patent Office's right to issue patents originates in Section 8, Clause
8 of the United States Constitution.65 A patent does not afford the patent
holder an affirmative right to make the patented invention.66 Instead, the Pat-
ent Act allows the patent holder to prevent others from practicing the pat-
ented invention: "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention . . . during the term of the patent therefor, in-
fringes the patent." 67 The Plant Patent Act makes an additional distinction,
granting to the patentee the right to prevent others from "asexually reproduc-
ing the plant."68 This patent monopoly does have limitations, including the
doctrines of patent misuse69 and patent exhaustion.70 This Comment will ad-
dress the doctrine of patent exhaustion, as it has been a frequently litigated
doctrine with respect to plant biotechnology.
Patent exhaustion, alternatively known as "the first sale doctrine," is a
common law doctrine providing an essential check on patent monopoly and
promoting the alienability of property.7 1 After the first authorized and uncon-
ditional purchase of a patented invention, the patent is exhausted and the
patent owner's rights terminate; consequently, the authorized purchaser can
sell, destroy, or use the patented invention without the consent or authority of
the patent owner. 72 The underlying premise of this first sale doctrine is that
"once the purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining
the use and enjoyment of the thing sold."73 In other words, once the patentee
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
66. Id.
67. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach.
Works, 261 U.S. 24, 34 (1923) (emphasis added).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2006).
69. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (1997) (Patent
misuse is a common law equitable doctrine by which courts prevent the en-
forcement of a patent that has been misused by the patentee. Examples of pat-
ent misuse may include a patentee's attempt to extend the patent beyond the
patent term or restricting a licensee's use of the patent in a way that hinders
competition).
70. Bowman v. Monsanto Co. (Bowman II), 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013).
71. Id. at 1764.
72. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008); see also
James R. Cartiglia & Nina Maja Bergmar, Beans & Books: Court Says Exhaus-
tion Doctrine Applies to Imported Textbooks, but Not Genetically Modified
Seeds, 49 TENN. B.J. 14, 15 (2013) (noting that patent exhaustion was first
discussed by the Supreme Court in Bloomer v. McQuewan); Bloomer v. Mc-
Quewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) ("[W]hen the machine passes to the hands of
the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly.").
73. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942).
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receives the benefit of the bargain, the patentee cannot exercise control over
the subsequent use of the patented invention.
A purchaser's use of the patented invention, however, is limited to that
which is contemplated by the patent itself and can be restricted by the terms
of a license.74 Courts have held that a sale of a patented article transfers to a
purchaser the right to "use" a patented invention, but not the right to "make"
a new article.75 Moreover, the sale must be authorized.76 Where a patentee
licenses the right to manufacture the patented article, the license typically
contains use restrictions. Thus, if the manufacturer creates and sells a pat-
ented article outside the scope of the license, that sale is not authorized, and
the patent has not been exhausted.77 Although the Federal Circuit has found
that patent exhaustion does not apply to conditional licenses, the Supreme
Court held that a patent may be exhausted where the licensed article "sub-
stantially embodies" the patented invention and where the license contem-
plates a use disclosed in the patent.78
i. Making versus using
Many flowering plants79 are self-pollinating, and as such, courts identify
them as "self-replicating technology."80 Scientists often allow plants to self-
pollinate, rather than introduce pollen from another plant, in order to main-
tain stable transgenic plant lines.81 The ability to self-pollinate is possible
74. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[W]hen a
patented product has been sold the purchaser acquires 'the right to use and sell
it, and . . . the authorized sale of an article which is capable of use only in
practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with respect to
the article sold.' ") (citing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249
(1942)).
75. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
76. Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. at 619.
77. See id. at 636 (citing Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175
(1938); Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938)).
78. Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. at 633, 638.
79. See Plant Systematics: Gymnosperms, IND. UNIV. Sw., https://www.ius.edu/
herbarium/gymnosperms.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2015) (As the reader is
surely aware, not all plants produce flowers. For example, gymnosperms are
non-flowering plants that produce cones rather than flowers.).
80. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman (Bowman 1), 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011),
affd in Bowman v. Monsanto Co. (Bowman II), 133 S. Ct. 1766 (2013).
81. See Priyanka Das & Naveen Chandra Joshi, Minor modifications in obtaining
Arabidopsis floral dip method enhances transformation efficiency and produc-
tion of homozygous transgenic lines harboring a single copy of transgene, AD-
VANCES IN BIOSCIENCE & BIOTECHNOLOGY, 59-60 (Feb. 2011), http://www
.scirp.org/journal/Paperlnformation.aspx?paperlD=4334 (Establishing stable
transgenic plant lines is necessary for scientists to study transgenes in succes-
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because flowering plants contain both male and female organs. 82 When the
plant reaches maturity, pollen from the male stamen will come into contact
with the female stigma, and the plant will then produce seed.83 At this point,
the plant contains both the first generation (plant) and second generation
(seed). Although the distinction between the first and second generations is
trivial, the Federal Circuit appears to have overlooked this fundamental as-
pect of plant reproduction.84
ii. Federal Circuit's approach
In Monsanto v. McFarling, the Federal Circuit held that patent exhaus-
tion does not apply to the sale of transgenic seed from a biotechnology com-
pany, Monsanto, to a farmer, McFarling.85 In this case, McFarling purchased
Roundup Ready soybean seeds through one of Monsanto's authorized dis-
tributors for the purpose of planting a commercial crop. 86 Despite
McFarling's signing the Technology Agreement, he saved and re-planted
seeds from his first commercial crop. 87 The fact that McFarling was in direct
violation of the terms of the Technology Agreement was not disputed; rather,
the issue was whether the sale from Monsanto to McFarling exhausted the
patent.88 The court held the patent was not exhausted because the new sec-
ond-generation seeds had not been the subject of a sale and because the
Technology Agreement "did not confer a license to construct new seeds." 89
As such, patent exhaustion did not apply to those particular seeds.90
Only a few years later, in Monsanto v. Scruggs, the Federal Circuit
again found in favor of Monsanto.91 In that case, Scruggs purchased, planted,
and re-planted saved Roundup Ready soybean and cotton seeds that he ob-
tained from a seed company. 92 However, unlike the farmer in McFarling,
sive experiments over long periods of time. It would be too difficult, for exam-
ple, if the scientist had to create a new transgenic plant line each time he or she
wanted to study the transgene. Using a single transgenic plant line also pro-
motes consistent, uniform, and repeatable results.).
82. CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 802.
83. Id.
84. See Bowman 1, 657 F.3d at 1348.
85. McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1299.
86. Id. at 1293.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1298-99.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
92. Id. at 1333.
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Scruggs did not sign the Technology Agreement.93 The court, in relying on
McFarling, held that there was no sale between the seed company and
Scruggs because agreeing to the terms of the Technology Agreement was a
pre-condition to Scruggs's use of the transgenic seed.94
The court also found that Scruggs did not have an implied license to
plant the seed because Monsanto expressly required each and every pur-
chaser to enter into the Technology Agreement, and, therefore, a reasonable
person would not believe that he or she had an implied license.95 Scruggs is
also routinely cited for the policy of not applying patent exhaustion to self-
replicat.ing technologies, as "applying the first sale doctrine to subsequent
generations of self-replicating technology would eviscerate the rights of the
patent holder."96
In the more recent decision of Monsanto v. Bowman (Bowman I), the
Federal Circuit held that a bona fide purchaser has only the right to "use" a
plant and does not have the right to "make" new seeds.97 Bowman was a
farmer who purchased commodity soybean seed from a grain elevator.98 Be-
cause commodity seed typically contains a mixture of transgenic and non-
transgenic seeds, Bowman planted and treated the seeds with Roundup to
determine which plants were resistant to herbicide.99 Bowman then allowed
the transgenic plants to reach maturity and sold the crop while saving some
of the transgenic seeds.oo Although Bowman's saving of his seed purchased
from the grain elevator was in direct violation of the terms of the Technology
Agreement, the issue in the case was whether the patent was exhausted when
the farmers sold the seed to the grain elevator.0o
In Bowman I, the Federal Circuit relied upon B. Braun Medical v. Ab-
bott Labs. and Jazz Photo v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, in addition to the foregoing
cases, as support for distinguishing between "making" and "using."102 In B.
Braun Medical, the court held that a sale of a patented medical reflux valve
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1336.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman (Bowman 1), 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(quoting Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
98. Id. at 1345.
99. Id. at 1345-46.
100. Id. at 1346.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1341.
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with a post-sale use restriction did not exhaust the patent.1 03 The court rea-
soned that in a conditional sale "the parties [have] negotiated a price that
reflects only the value of the 'use' rights conferred by the patentee."04 This
reasoning in B. Braun Medical was nothing more than dicta and was not the
central issue of the case. The court actually remanded the case based upon an
improper jury instruction.105 Even so, the Federal Circuit in Bowman I relied
upon the dicta in B. Braun Medical to hold that Bowman received only a
narrow right to "use" the patented transgene from the Technology
Agreement.
The Federal Circuit also relied on Jazz Photo. In Jazz Photo, the patent
in question was directed not to a self-replicating organism but to camera
film.106 The court in Jazz Photo held that a licensee's right to "use" camera
film did "not include the right to construct an essentially new article on the
template of the original."107 In Bowman I, the Federal Circuit interpreted this
statement quite broadly and concluded that Bowman's right to "use" did not
include the right to "construct" second-generation transgenic seeds.108 The
license contemplated the right to plant the first-generation transgenic seeds,
but not the right to make second-generation transgenic seeds.109
This reasoning, applied to the first limitation in Monsanto's Technology
Agreement, is nonsensical. It restricts the farmer's "use [of] the seed contain-
ing Monsanto gene technologies for planting a commercial crop only in a
single season"o Once the farmer has planted the seed, the seed will germi-
nate, and the plant will mature and produce new seed because plants are self-
pollinating and self-reproducing.II1 Moreover, at least in the case of soy-
beans, the farmer harvests and cultivates mature plants-meaning the com-
mercial crop will necessarily contain the new seed.112 It follows that, in order
to "use" the transgenic seed, the farmer will necessarily have to plant and
"make" new seeds.
103. See B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419, 1426-27
(1997).
104. Id. at 1426.
105. See id. at 1426-27.
106. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1098 (2001).
107. Id. at 1102.
108. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman (Bowman 1), 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
109. Id. at 1344-45.
110. Id. at 1344.
111. See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 802.
112. See Growing Soybeans, supra note 12.
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iii. Supreme Court's approach
On appeal from the Federal Circuit's decision in Bowman I, a unani-
mous Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's ruling.113 The Supreme
Court held that patent exhaustion did not apply to the sale of Monsanto's
transgenic plants. However, the Supreme Court applied different reasoning
than the Federal Circuit did in Bowman J.114 The Supreme Court reasoned
that patent exhaustion only applied to the sale of a "particular article" and not
to the sale of a subsequent article, whether created from the original particu-
lar article or by some other means."t5 If a patentee were not compensated for
the sale of the subsequent article, then the purpose of the patent exhaustion
doctrine-to ensure the patentee receives the benefit of the bargain-would
be frustrated.116
Rather than distinguishing between the right to "use" and the right to
"make" within the context of a conditional license, the Supreme Court
avoided this issue by focusing primarily on Bowman's purchase of the com-
modity seed from the grain elevator rather than directly from Monsanto."17
The Court also addressed the creation of the new infringing article itself.
First, Bowman purchased the commodity seeds directly from the grain eleva-
tor so the only proper use was for consumption rather than planting.18 As a
result, it was not necessary for the Court to determine whether the right to
"use" included the right to "make," because, under these circumstances,
Bowman was not authorized to plant the seed under the terms of the Agree-
ment.11 9 Second, in the context of a sexually reproducing plant, the only way
to create a new infringing article is to plant the seed.120 The Court suggested
then that infringement could have occurred upon the planting rather than the
subsequent "making" of the seeds.121
The Supreme Court also addressed its reasoning in J.E.M. Ag Supply.
There, the Court addressed the scope of protection under patents and certifi-
cates of plant variety protection. The Court reasoned that, because certifi-
cates of plant variety protection were traditionally believed to offer narrower
rights, yet still give breeders the right to prevent buyers from selling seed,
113. Bowman v. Monsanto Co. (Bowman II), 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1766 (2013).
114. See Bowman II, 133 S. Ct. at 1766.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 1767.
117. Id. at 1766.
118. Id. at 1765.
119. See id. at 1768.
120. Bowman II, 133 S. Ct. at 1768.
121. See id. at 1766-67.
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then patentees, who have broader rights, should be able to prevent buyers
from making seed.122
The Supreme Court in Bowman II also noted that its holding was limited
to the particular facts of the case-particularly that "Bowman planted Mon-
santo's patented soybeans solely to make and market replicas of them . . .
[p]atent exhaustion provides no haven for that conduct."23 With this state-
ment, it stands to reason that perhaps the inverse is true-patent exhaustion
or some other kind of equitable doctrine could prevent the patentee from
asserting its rights where the creation of the seeds is inadvertent and not
willful. This reasoning is also reflected in the terms of the Technology
Agreement itself. The terms do not expressly prevent farmers from making
new seed. Rather, the language impliedly requires an intent-to-create or in-
tent-to-make transgenic seeds because the Agreement prevents farmers from
"sav[ing] any crop produced from this seed for replanting" and "us[ing] th[e]
seed or provid[ing] it to anyone for . . . seed production."24 Some scholars
have also suggested that Congress should add an "intent-to-acquire" element
to plant patent infringement.125
III. CROSS-POLLINATION
The organic food movement started in the 1960s in response to growing
consumer concerns about the safety of genetically modified plants and the
effects of widespread pesticide use on the ecosystem.1 2 6 Food companies
were quick-as they typically are-to seize an opportunity to market their
products as being free of genetically modified organisms.127 As a result, con-
sumers are now bombarded with food claims, such as claims that certain
foods are "vitamin enriched" or "all natural."l28 Well-known food writer
Michael Pollan reports that the organic food industry is an $11 billion indus-
try and claims that the industry is "the fastest growing sector of the food
122. See id. at 1767-68.
123. See id. at 1769.
124. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman (Bowman 1), 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
125. See Hilary Preston, Note, Drift of Patented Genetically Engineered Crops: Re-
thinking Liability Theories, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1168-69 (2003) (arguing
that "[t]he innocent possessor derives no benefit from the patented goods and
may even suffer harm by the invasion. This difference justifies adding the re-
quirement of intent to infringe (or at least knowledge of infringement) in cases
in which possession is a sufficient basis for infringement").
126. See Kate L. Harrison, Organic Plus: Regulating Beyond the Current Organic
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economy."29 Lawmakers in the 1960s, however, were concerned about con-
sumer deception and the standards by which these foods were actually pro-
duced.130 For example, the term "natural" has not been defined by the Food
and Drug Administration to this day, and as such, its meaning varies signifi-
cantly.131 To establish national standards for the production and handling of
organic foods, Congress passed the Organic Foods Production Act.132
A. Requirements and Protection for Organic Plants
i. Organic Foods Production Act
The Organic Foods Production Act delegated authority to the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) to promulgate and enforce regulations gov-
erning labeling requirements, organic production, and certification
requirements.133 The USDA established the National Organic Program to
govern certification, authentication, and labeling.134 States may also institute
their own state organic certification programs, so long as they are consistent
with and satisfy the minimum requirements of the National Organic
Program. 135
To obtain organic certification under the National Organic Program,
farmers must satisfy two requirements. First, farmers must produce their
crops without using synthetic chemicals, including heavy metals, toxic resi-
dues, and any other unapproved synthetic substance that does not appear on
the National List.136 This provision requires farmers to cease labeling and
selling their products as organic when the levels of a synthetic chemical are
129. MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE'S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR
MEALS 136 (2006).
130. See Kenneth C. Amaditz, The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 and its
Impending Regulations: A Big Zero for Organic Food?, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
537, 537-38 (1997).
131. What is the meaning of 'natural' on the label of food?, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADM., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm2I4868.htm
(last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
132. See Organic Foods Production Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012) ("It is the purpose
of this chapter: (1) to establish national standards governing the marketing of
certain agricultural products as organically produced products; (2) to assure
consumers that organically produced products meet a consistent standard; and
(3) to facilitate interstate commerce in fresh and processed food that is organi-
cally produced.").
133. See id. § 6503(a).
134. National Organic Program, U. S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/
print/about-ams/programs-offices/national-organic-program (last visited Oct.
15, 2015).
135. See Organic Foods Production Act § 6506(d).
136. See id. § 6517; see generally 7 C.F.R. § 205.601 (2001).
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"greater than unavoidable residual environmental contamination."137 The Na-
tional Organic Program does, however, permit low levels of non-authorized
substances that are 5 percent or below the Environmental Protection
Agency's tolerance.1 38 Second, farmers must submit an "organic plan" show-
ing sustainable and environmentally-friendly production methods as well as a
management history to ensure that the farmer has not applied unauthorized
substances to the crops.1 39 Organic certification is also, of course, a pre-con-
dition to selling food with the "organic" label.140
After receiving organic certification, the farmer must maintain detailed
records describing the type and amount of substances applied to the crop for
at least five years.141 Notably, organic farmers also have an affirmative obli-
gation to ensure that prohibited, non-organic substances do not contaminate
their crops.1 42 To prevent contamination, organic farmers must have suffi-
cient boundaries surrounding their fields to reasonably separate organically
grown crops from prohibited substances.143 Certifying agents conduct annual
inspections of the farm and residue testing of the products.144
B. Plant Protection Act
Congress enacted the Plant Protection Act to govern the process that
biotechnology companies use to introduce transgenic plants into the ecosys-
tem.1 45 The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service enforces the Plant
Protection Act.146 The agency has discretion to seize or destroy any organism
or substance that it determines is a "plant pest" or "noxious weed."147
However, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service does not have
exclusive authority to regulate plants.148 For instance, the Food and Drug
137. Organic Foods Production Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012).
138. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.671 (2001).
139. Organic Foods Production Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6504 (2012); § 6513(f).
140. Id. § 6502(20).
141. Id. § 6519(b)(2), § 6513(a).
142. 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(c).
143. Id.
144. 7 U.S.C. § 6506(a)(5)-(6).
145. See Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012).
146. Id. § 7711.
147. 7 U.S.C. § 7714(a); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829, 934
(9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the agency's jurisdiction turns on whether "the
organism is a 'plant pest' within the meaning of the statute") (citing 7 U.S.C.
§ 7701(14); 7 C.F.R. § 340.2, n.4 (2013)).
148. See 7 U.S.C. § 7702(14) ("The term 'plant pest' means any living stage of any
of the following that can directly or indirectly injure, cause damage to, or cause
disease in any plant or plant product."); see also Ctr. for Food Safety, 718 F.3d
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Administration regulates plants to the extent that those plants, or their parts,
are sold as food.149 However, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
has the authority to regulate transgenic plants that were created using an or-
ganism or substance with a deleterious effect on other plants.150 In other
words, when a harmful organism or substance is incorporated within a trans-
genic plant, the entire transgenic plant becomes a "plant pest," giving the
agency jurisdiction to regulate the entire plant.151
Before introducing a "regulated article," companies have a duty either to
notify or to obtain permission from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service.152 For example, a company that intends to introduce a transgenic
plant through "environmental release" must notify the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service thirty days before the introduction.153 Further, the
company has six months from the introduction to submit a required "field
test report" containing "all deleterious effects on plants, nontarget organisms,
or the environment."154 Finally, the company must follow various perform-
ance standards,155 such as growing transgenic plants in a manner that pre-
vents cross-pollination with unintended, organic plants and adequately
storing transgenic seeds to prevent ipadvertent germination.156
Interpreting the Plant Protection Act, the Ninth Circuit held that trans-
genic alfalfa seed is not a "plant pest."157 In Center for Food Safety v. Vil-
sack, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service had deregulated
Monsanto's transgenic alfalfa seed.158 A group of environmentalists and
farmers subsequently sued the agency, challenging the deregulation.159 The
Ninth Circuit addressed whether the incorporation of a known plant pest
within the transgenic alfalfa seed made the seed itself a plant pest. 160 Mon-
santo's use of Agrobacterium, a gram-negative bacteria and plant pest, intro-
at 833 (noting that genetically modified plants are regulated by various federal
agencies including the Food and Drug Administration, Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, and the United States Department of Agriculture.).
149. See Ctr. for Food Safety, 718 F.3d at 833.
150. Id. at 836-37.
151. Id.
152. 7 C.F.R. § 340.0(a)(1) (2012).
153. Id. § 340.3(d)(3)(iii).
154. Id. § 340.3(d)(4).
155. See id. § 340.3(c) (setting forth mandatory performance standards "for any in-
troductions under the notification procedure").
156. Id. § 340.3(c)(1)-(2).
157. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 2013).
158. Id. at 831-32.
159. Id. at 832.
160. Id. at 836.
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duced the transgene to the alfalfa seed, and the resulting transgenic plant's
genome contained Agrobacterium DNA.161 After conducting additional stud-
ies, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service determined that the pres-
ence of Agrobacterium DNA did not pose a risk of harm to other plants.162
Therefore, the agency decided that the transgenic alfalfa seed was not a plant
pest, and the Ninth Circuit upheld this decision.163 As a result, the agency
lacked the jurisdiction needed to regulate the transgenic alfalfa seed.164 Un-
fortunately, no other conventional farmer is likely to prevail under this theory
because the majority of transgenic flowering plants are created through the
Agrobacterium method.165
In 2008, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service proposed a
regulation to amend the transgenic plant rules by broadening the definition of
"plant pest."l 66 This expanded definition would have included non-living
plant material and, in turn, would have allowed the agency to regulate the
movement of pollen grains.167 Additionally, the proposed regulation might
have significantly impacted a farmer's ability to recover damages from a
biotechnology company based on cross-pollination contamination.168 In the
spring of 2015, however, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
withdrew its proposed regulation.1 69 The agency has recently began soliciting
comments regarding the regulation of transgenic plants and, in particular,
whether a complete overhaul of the law is necessary.1 70
C. Trace Amount Contamination
As illustrated above, there are a number of regulatory hurdles an organic
farmer must overcome in order to obtain and maintain the highly coveted
161. Id.
162. Id. at 837.
163. Ctr. For Food Safety, 718 F.3d at 836.
164. Id. at 842.
165. See Office of the Gene Tech. Regulator, Risk Assessment Reference: Methods
of Plant Genetic Modification, AUSTL. DEP'T OF HEALTH, http://www.ogtr.gov
.auintemet/ogtr/publishing.nsf/content/plant-modifications-ref- I -htm (last up-
dated Dec. 19, 2012) (setting forth "the most common three methods for genet-
ically modifying . . . plants"); see also Das & Joshi, supra note 81, at 59-67
(providing a detailed, scientific explanation of the Agrobacterium method).
166. Importation, Interstate Movement, and Release Into the Environment of Certain
Genetically Engineered Organisms, 80 Fed. Reg. 11, 598 (withdrawn Mar. 4,
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organic certification status.171 Because regulatory compliance requires signif-
icant time and investment, organic trade organizations, unsurprisingly, are
very concerned about the threat of genetic drift, i.e., contamination of their
organic crops by transgenic crops.1 72 So far, courts have only addressed the
issue of standing-that is, whether the threat of cross-pollination between
organic and non-organic crops constitutes a justiciable injury. The Federal
Circuit and Supreme Court have, once again, analyzed the issue differently.
Biotechnology companies like Monsanto have argued that they will not
assert their patents against farmers whose crops merely have a "trace
amount" of the patented transgene.1 73 However, courts have failed to ac-
knowledge that "trace amounts" of genes will likely cause the majority of a
farmer's crop to suffer from long-term contamination.174 Moreover, this risk
is heightened by the fact that organic farmers may not know or have a reason
to know that their crops are contaminated. Unless the plant exhibits some
other physiological effect from the insertion of the transgene, organic farmers
would be unable to detect the transgene's presence because they do not apply
herbicides to their crops, even those with glyphosate (i.e., synthetic chemi-
cals).175 One possibility is that, by the time the farmer learns of the contami-
nation, a high percentage of the crop will already be contaminated, resulting
in increased costs and decreased profits.176 Although scientists can easily de-
tect the presence of a transgene through laboratory experiments, this testing
is costly and places an undue burden on the farmer.177
In Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., the Federal
Circuit found that the mere possibility of cross-pollination was not an imme-
diate threat and, thus, did not warrant a non-infringement declaration.178 Over
seventy organic agricultural organizations sought a declaratory judgment of
non-infringement against Monsanto, arguing that cross-pollination was im-
171. See supra Part IH.A.i.
172. See, e.g., Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829, 830-32 (9th Cir.
2013).
173. See, e.g., Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d
1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
174. See id. at 1360.
175. See supra Part m.A.i.
176. See Richard A. Repp, Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for Genetically
Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHo L. REV. 585, 591-93
(2000).
177. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; see also Kellyn S. Betts, Growing
Evidence of Widespread GMO Contamination, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE
PoL'Y (Dec. 14, 1999), http://www.iatp.org/news/growing-evidence-of-wide-
spread-gino-contamination (providing a detailed explanation of the process and
costs of testing for crop contamination); Repp, supra note 176, at 591-93 (not-
ing various examples of when scientific testing revealed crop contamination).
178. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1360.
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minent and inevitable.179 Although the Federal Circuit acknowledged that
cross-pollination was inevitable, the court found that this likelihood of harm
was speculative. 80 Further, the court held that the standard for a justiciable
case or controversy was not satisfied because cross-pollination did not pre-
sent a "substantial risk" of harm.181 Therefore, the organic agricultural orga-
nizations lacked standing to sue.1 82
The Federal Circuit also found that the organic trade organizations
lacked standing "[b]ecause Monsanto ha[d] made binding assurances that it
will not 'take legal action."83 Specifically, Monsanto makes the following
commitment on its website: "It has never been, nor will it be Monsanto pol-
icy to exercise its patent rights where trace amounts of our patented seeds or
traits are present in farmer's fields as a result of inadvertent means."84 Nota-
bly, the commitment does not define "trace amounts" or "inadvertent
means"185 and appears to govern Monsanto's relationship with its custom-
ers.186 The court found that these statements and Monsanto's representations
in court constituted "binding assurances" that Monsanto would not suefarm-
ers.87 Despite these "binding assurances," Monsanto refused to agree to a
covenant not to sue throughout the course of the litigation.188 Monsanto ar-
gued that it lacked incentive to sue based on the inability to recover sufficient
damages.189 While this may be true, consumers may perceive Monsanto's
blanket assurances as merely a public relations attempt to handle the back-
lash it had received.
The Federal Circuit addressed, but did not resolve, whether a farmer
would be liable for patent infringement if the transgenic seed inadvertently
179. Id. at 1350, 1353-54.
180. Id. at 1357, 1360.
181. Id. at 1360.
182. Id. at 1361.
183. Id. at 1352 (quoting Memorandum of Law in Support of Monsanto Company
and Monsanto Technology LLC's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Mat-
ter Jurisdiction at 5, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co.,
851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-CV-2163)).




186. See Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1357-58 (discussing how Monsanto
views its online commitment).
187. Id. at 1352, 1358.
188. Id. at 1354.
189. Id.
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contaminated the farmer's crop. 190 The Federal Circuit noted that the Su-
preme Court has suggested that patent exhaustion would not apply to unin-
tentional infringement cases.1 91 Despite the Supreme Court's suggestion, the
Federal Circuit rejected this equitable argument and noted that de minimis
infringement is still infringement, whether intentional or unintentional.192
In refusing to find non-infringement based on equitable principles, the
Federal Circuit cited its own precedent from SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp. as authority.193 In SmithKline Beecham, the Federal Circuit re-
versed the district court's limitation of a claim directed to a chemical com-
pound.194 The appellate court held that claim construction of a patent is not
influenced by policy considerations.195 Thus, the Federal Circuit suggested
that it will not follow the Supreme Court's suggestion in Bowman II and,
instead, will decide the issue in favor of the patentee without considering
equity.196
Organic Seed Growers appears to be one of the only cases addressing
the issue of contamination by transgenic crops and, more specifically,
whether contamination constitutes patent infringement. In concluding that the
possibility of cross-pollination is too speculative, the Federal Circuit under-
estimated the unpredictable nature of plant biology and failed to properly
weigh the district court's finding that such contamination was "inevitable."l97
Traditionally, non-living products are evaluated through the standards of
harm,198 but, unlike these products, plants are self-reproducing organisms.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, patent infringement does not require an
190. Id. at 1356.
191. Id. at 1356, 1361 n.4 ("Bowman was not a passive observer of his soybeans'
multiplication. . . . In another case, the [seed]'s self-replication might occur
outside the [farmer's] control.") (quoting Bowman v. Monsanto Co. (Bowman
II), 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013)).
192. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1356.
193. Id.
194. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
195. Id. at 1339-40.
196. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1356.
197. Id. at 1357 (citing Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 851
F.Supp. 2d 544, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
198. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Sprint Commc'ns Co., L.P. v.
APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273-74 (2008) (explaining that "Article III
standing" requires the plaintiff to have suffered "an injury in fact," meaning "a
'concrete and particularized' invasion of a 'legally protected interest' ") (quot-
ing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); but see
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 146, 155 (2010) (finding
that the deregulation of Monsanto's Roundup Ready alfalfa seed posed a "sig-
nificant risk" of genetic drift and harm to conventional farmers).
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intent element.1 99 Although the Supreme Court suggested that equity consid-
erations should govem an unintentional infringement case, the Federal Cir-
cuit disagreed with this policy argument. 200 Further, the Federal Circuit
apparently decided the case entirely on Monsanto's commitment not to sue
based on "trace amount" contamination.201 However, the standard to evaluate
whether a farmer forfeits organic certification status is not "trace amount"
contamination, but "unavoidable residual environmental contamination." 202
D. Significant Risk of Contamination
The Supreme Court briefly discussed the significant risk of contamina-
tion in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms.203 After finding that the trans-
genic seed did not pose a significant risk to the environment, the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service approved the deregulation of Monsanto's
Roundup Ready alfalfa seed.204 Conventional farmers and environmental
groups challenged the agency's deregulation on procedural grounds.205 The
Supreme Court reversed the injunction against deregulation and, in effect,
affirmed the agency's deregulation.206 The Court found that the environmen-
talists had standing, because deregulation posed a "significant risk" of ge-
netic drift and harm to conventional farmers.207
Similar to their disagreement on applying patent exhaustion to trans-
genic plants, the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court also disagree on the
standing requirements for conventional and organic farmers.208 The Federal
Circuit held that "trace amounts" would not support a justiciable case or con-
troversy. 209 However, the Supreme Court found that the deregulation of a
transgenic crop presented a "significant risk," which was sufficiently con-
crete to establish an injury-in-fact.210
Despite this apparent conflict of interpretations, the Supreme Court
chose not to address the issue and denied certiorari in Organic Seed Grow-
199. Preston, supra note 125, at 1157 ("[A] patent infringement claim does not have
intent as an element of the infringement.").
200. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1356.
201. Id. at 1358.
202. 7 U.S.C. § 6511 (2012).
203. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. at 155.
204. Id. at 144, 146.
205. Id. at 146.
206. Id. at 155.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 141; Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 718
F.3d 1350, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
209. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1360-61.
210. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. at 141.
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ers.2 11 The Supreme Court may have believed Organic Seed Growers was
not the appropriate case to decide the issue because the farmers had not yet
suffered an injury. On the other hand, it is arguable that the Court agreed
with the Federal Circuit that the threat of cross-pollination does not satisfy
standing requirements. As a result of this uncertainty, the threat of inadver-
tent infringement will loom large until the Supreme Court definitively ad-
dresses this issue.
E. Tort Liability
With the exception of a few cases, including Organic Seed Growers and
Geertson Seed Farms, courts have yet to address the issue of transgenic crops
cross-pollinating with organic crops. 212 However, the related issue of pesti-
cide drift has been litigated before the highest courts of some states under
traditional tort theories, including strict liability, trespass, negligence, nui-
sance, and conversion of chattels.213 Contamination by pesticides and con-
tamination by transgenic crops both occur in a similar way, i.e., through
wind, water, and other environmental means.2 14 Thus, courts may apply simi-
lar logic to organic crop contamination.
i. Strict liability
In Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., the Supreme Court of Washington held
that trace amounts of pesticides and a subsequent decertification of organic
status constituted an economic loss.215 In Langan, Valicopters inadvertently
sprayed a portion of the Langans' crop with pesticide.216 The Langans were
members and founders of the Northwest Organic Food Producers' Associa-
tion (NOFPA), an organization that had the power to certify its members "as
organic food growers."217 NOFPA requires certified growers to comply with
its bylaws, which provide, in part, that farmers may not use any quantity of
211. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 134 S. Ct. 901 (2014)
(mem.).
212. See generally Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139; see also Organic Seed
Growers, 718 F.3d at 1350.
213. See, e.g., Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 220 (Wash. 1977); John-
son v. Paynesville, Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 696 (Minn.
2012).
214. See Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1357 (explaining that both the district
court and Monsanto recognized that "windblown pollen or seeds" can cause
crop contamination); Johnson, 817 N.W.2d at 700 (noting that the farmers'
complaint centered on the fact that the wind carried the pesticide onto their
land); see also Repp, supra note 176, at 591-93 (explaining various ways in
which cross-pollination can occur).
215. Langan, 567 P.2d at 222.
216. Id. at 219.
217. Id. at 219-20.
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pesticides "on food or in the soil in which products are grown."218 Despite
the inadvertent means by which their crop was contaminated, NOFPA decer-
tified the Langans' as organic farmers because their crop contained trace
amounts of pesticide.219 As a result, the Langans were unable to sell their
crop.220
The court held that Valicopters could be strictly liable for damages to
the farmers' crops. 221 The court found that aerial spraying of pesticides was
an abnormally dangerous activity that posed an unavoidable risk, despite the
exercise of reasonable care. 2 22 Therefore, finding for the Langans, the court
balanced equitable interests and required Valicopters to reimburse the
Langans.223
The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 was enacted thirteen years
after Langan, making it unclear whether the case would have been decided
the same way today.224 The Act's regulations contain a narrow exception for
low levels of inadvertent contamination.225 Therefore, if the pesticide levels
exceed those in the Act, Langan is more likely to support the argument that
genetic drift-like pesticide drift-causes substantial economic loss due to
the loss of organic certification.226
ii. Trespass
In Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Co., the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota addressed whether pesticide drift contamination
gave rise to causes of action for trespass, nuisance, and negligence per se.2 27
Like Valicopters, the Paynesville Cooperative sprayed the field next to an
organic farm with pesticide on multiple occasions.228 The organic farmer's
testing revealed the presence of chemicals in his crop, and the farmer re-
ported his findings to state and federal certifying agents. 229 Later, the farmer
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 220.
221. Langan, 567 P.2d at 221-23.
222. Id. at 223.
223. Id.
224. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6522 (2012); Lan-
gan, 567 P.2d at 218 (decided in 1977).
225. 7 C.F.R. § 205.671 (2012).
226. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.671; Langan, 567 P.2d at 219-20, 222.
227. Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 696
(Minn. 2012).
228. Id. at 697-98; Langan, 567 P.2d at 222 (explaining that Valicopters inadver-
tently sprayed a portion of the Langans' crop with pesticide).
229. Johnson, 817 N.W.2d at 698.
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received letters regarding violations of the Organic Foods Production Act's
certification requirements,230 and although the farmer did not have evidence
that the levels of the chemicals exceeded the minimum amounts, he ceased
production entirely.231
First, the court held that pesticide drift would not support a trespass
claim because the pesticide contamination concerned an "intangible agency"
or "particulate matter."23 2 Therefore, the pesticide contamination did not in-
terfere with the farmer's right of possession.233 Second, the court found that
the farmer's removal of the crop from production was premature, because the
inadvertent application of the pesticide did not constitute a regulatory viola-
tion.234 According to the court's interpretation of the regulation, "the phrase
'applied to it"' refers solely to the farmer's application of pesticide.235 Thus,
a third party's application of pesticide would be permissible.236
Although the court relied on cases that dismissed trespass claims based
on a mere invasion of odors, it did not define these terms or explain how
pesticide molecules are intangible property. 237 This court erroneously con-
cluded that pesticides are intangible property. However, the result in Johnson
would likely be different if contamination by transgenic crops were involved.
Although transgenes are intangible property, they cannot be physically sepa-
rated from the tangible seed or plant.238 Moreover, many patents claim
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 700-02.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 707-08 (finding that a violation of the regulation at issue under the
Organic Foods Production Act requires the farmer himself to apply the prohib-
ited substance to his crops (citing 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(b) (2001))).
235. Johnson, 817 N.W.2d at 708.
236. See id.; see also 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(b) (requiring that an "organic," agricultural
product "[h]ave no prohibited substances . . . applied to it for a period of 3
years immediately preceding harvest of the crop").
237. See Johnson, 817 N.W.2d at 702-03; but see Intangible, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/intangible (last visited Sept. 18, 2015)
(defining "intangible" as "incapable of being perceived by the sense of touch,
as incorporeal or immaterial things").
238. See Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (conceding that "genetically modified seeds cannot eas-
ily be separated from conventional seeds; thus, a grower who harvests and uses
or sells contaminated crops risks incurring infringement liability"); see also
Stephen M. Scanlon, Should Missouri Farmers of Genetically Modified Crops
Be Held Liable for Genetic Drift and Cross-Pollination?, 10 Mo. ENVTL. L. &
PO' Y REV. 1, 7-8 (2003) (explaining that, in the context of trespass, "an or-
ganic farmer would be barred from recovering damages for the intrusion of
GMO pollen onto his land if GMO pollen is considered an intangible object");
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both the transgene itself, as well as the seed and plant containing the trans-
gene.239
In addition, the court's interpretation of Organic Foods Production Act
usurps legislative intent. The Act was intended to increase consumer confi-
dence by providing uniform standards for the production and control of or-
ganic crops. 240 The Supreme Court of Minnesota's interpretation of the Act
allows indirect application of pesticides to a farmer's crop, which frustrates
the Act's purpose by permitting farmers to solicit third party application of
pesticides. In his dissent, Justice Page quoted the Supreme Court's standpoint
on statutory construction: "use of passive voice in statutory phrase . . . re-
flects agnosticism . . . about who does the using."241 Because the Supreme
Court of Minnesota ignored this traditional rule of statutory construction, its
interpretation of the regulation implementing the statute was incorrect.
Furthermore, no other state has relied on the court's reasoning in John-
son to hold that contamination of organic crops does not constitute an action-
able tort. Therefore, Johnson is unlikely to influence transgenic crop
contamination jurisprudence. In any event, the suit provides an interesting
case study on how a court may approach the issue of contamination.
iii. Negligence
In June of 2013, Ernest Barnes, a farmer in Kansas, alleged that Mon-
santo breached its duty of care by introducing transgenic wheat to his non-
transgenic wheat fields.242 Among his various assertions, Barnes argued that
but see Johnson, 817 N.W.2d at 700, 702 (finding that pesticide is "particulate
matter" and "an intangible agency").
239. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also Paul J. Heald & James
Charles Smith, The Problem of Social Cost in A Genetically Modified Age, 58
HASTINGs L.J. 87, 101, 151 n.47 (2006) ("Many GMO seeds and the pollen
that GMO plants produce are patented.") (citing J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer High-Bred Int'l Inc., 534 U.S. 125, 141 (2001))); Sabrina Wilson, In-
duced Nuisance: Holding Patent Owners Liable for Gmo Cross-Contamina-
tion, 64 EMORY L.J. 169, 186-87 (2014) ("Once a seed is genetically
engineered by Monsanto scientists, the seed is considered an embodiment of
Monsanto's patented technology.").
240. Organic Foods Production Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012) ("It is the purpose of
this chapter: (1) to establish national standards governing the marketing of cer-
tain agricultural products as organically produced products; (2) to assure con-
sumers that organically produced products meet a consistent standard; and (3)
to facilitate interstate commerce in fresh and processed food that is organically
produced.").
241. Johnson, 817 N.W.2d at 716 (Page, J., dissenting) (quoting Dean v. United
States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009)).
242. Complaint at 1, 5, 36, Barnes v. Monsanto Co., No. 6:13CV01218 (D. Kan.
Dismissed Feb. 10, 2014, 2013 WL 2401640); see also Roxana Hegeman,
Monsanto Sued over Genetically Modified Wheat, USA TODAY, June 4, 2013,
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Monsanto failed to prevent cross-pollination by birds and wind.243 A court
never addressed this issue, as Monsanto swiftly settled with the farmer for an
undisclosed amount.244
The ultimate issue in Barnes was whether Monsanto's duty of care to
the farmer included the duty to prevent contamination of transgenic wheat.245
Although one could reasonably argue that the patent-holder should bear the
responsibility and suffer the consequences when cross-pollination occurs, the
Organic Foods Production Act takes a different approach. Under the Organic
Foods Production Act, the farmer has the responsibility to prevent cross-
pollination through the use of "buffer zones."246
However, neither the farmer nor the patent-holder should bear the entire
burden of seed testing to determine the amount and extent of crop contamina-
tion resulting from transgenic seed. As a practical matter, enforcement is
difficult and burdensome for the farmer and the biotechnology company,
even if the company is better suited to absorb and reallocate costs. 247 Because
cross-pollination is inevitable, the question is not whether the plants will be
contaminated, but rather when the plants will be contaminated by transgenic
seeds drifting onto neighboring lands through wind, water, or other means.
That said, the principles of equity require Monsanto and other biotech-
nology companies to proportionately compensate farmers for the harm
caused. Alternatively, farmers could insure their crops against cross-pollina-
tion from transgenic crops. Cross-pollination is incidental to biotechnology
companies introducing transgenic crops into the environment.248 As the origi-
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/04/farmer-monsanto-
genetically-engineered-wheat/2388957 (reporting that Ernest Barnes, a farmer
in Kansas, filed a lawsuit against Monsanto, "claiming the company's gross
negligence hurt U.S. growers. . .").
243. Complaint, supra note 242, at 23.
244. Minute Order, Barnes v. Monsanto Co., No. 6:13CV01218 (D. Kan. Feb. 10,
2014), Dkt. No. 8 (Barnes voluntarily dismissed his case against Monsanto
Co.).
245. Complaint, supra note 242, at 36-39.
246. 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(c) (2001).
247. See supra notes 141-143, 152-156 and accompanying text; see also Repp,
supra note 176, at 594-95 (explaining the "significant investment of time and
money" required at various stages in the certification process, including when
certification is lost); Betts, supra note 177 (explaining the various costs associ-
ated with crop contamination testing).
248. See Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (noting that "the district court held that it is likely inevi-
table that conventional crops will be contaminated by trace amounts of wind-
blown pollen or seeds from genetically modified crops or other sources" (citing
Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F.Supp. 2d 544,
548 (S.D.N.Y. 2012))); see also Wilson, supra note 239, at 171-72 (explaining
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nators of this patented technology, they should bear some of the responsibil-
ity for the harm this technology has caused downstream, especially
considering the foreseeable risks to the environment and organic farming in
the future.
iv. Conversion
While the drift of transgenic seed could support an additional cause of
action for conversion of chattels, this novel argument is unlikely to prevail.
In a traditional conversion claim, the defendant's intentional exercise of such
substantial dominion over the chattel interferes with the owner's right of con-
trol and justifies reimbursing the owner for the chattel's full value.249 A court
may impute intent when the defendant exercised such substantial control that
it actually interfered with the owner's right to exercise control.250
The contamination of organic crops could constitute a conversion of
chattel. T o establish the intentional tort of conversion, however, the farmer
would have to overcome the difficult burden of proving the element of intent,
which may be imputed to a patent-holder. For example, the introduction of a
transgene to an organically grown population could result in substantial con-
trol and actual interference because the farmer would no longer be able to
sell the crop. 25 1 It is more likely, though, that the cross-pollination would not
result in the entire crop being contaminated.252 Moreover, the farmer may be
able to sell the crop at a reduced price. While losing organic certification is a
substantial harm, it probably does not rise to the level of conversion.253
Therefore, a farmer is unlikely to succeed on a claim for conversion of
chattels.
that "[d]ue to self-replication, [] genetically modified DNA will [] pass to
future plant generations").
249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(l) (1965).
250. Id. § 222A(2)(b), (d).
251. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text; see also Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 219-20 (Wash. 1977) (explaining that the Lan-
gans were unable to sell their crop due to an inadvertent, pesticide contamina-
tion); Repp, supra note 176, at 591-93 (noting various instances where cross-
contamination caused economic damage).
252. See Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693,
706-12 (Minn. 2012) (holding that "[t]he Cooperative's pesticide drift [ ] could
not proximately cause the Johnsons' [entire] soybean field to be taken out of
organic production for 3 years" because "a third party's pesticide drift cannot
cause a field to lose organic certification."); but see Repp, supra note 176, at
591-93 (discussing various situations in which cross-contamination caused ex-
tensive economic damage).
253. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 222A(2) (1965) (listing factors to deter-
mine whether the actor's control was substantial enough to justify full reim-
bursement to the owner).
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In the aggregate, very few farmers have brought tort claims against the
biotechnology industry, but this may be an area of future litigation. However,
the cases relating to pesticide drift do not appear promising for conventional
farmers. Strict liability requires an abnormally dangerous activity,254 yet
transgenic crops are likely not "unsafe" even though the chemicals and pesti-
cides used in conjunction with them may be carcinogenic.255
The most persuasive causes of action are trespass and negligence, but
proving intent and breach of care on the part of the biotechnology company,
both of which are necessary for reimbursement, will be challenging.256 Con-
sidering how forcefully Monsanto asserts its patent portfolio, its settlement
with Barnes was not only surprising, but also supports the notion that a
farmer's greatest chance of recovery is under a negligence theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
As this Comment illustrates, there are a number of unresolved issues
related to patent exhaustion, inadvertent infringement, and trace amount con-
tamination. The Supreme Court has suggested that inadvertent infringement
may result in patent exhaustion257 or, alternatively, that courts should balance
equitable and patent principles.258 Despite the Supreme Court's guidance, the
Federal Circuit has continued to assert that de minimis or "trace amount"
infringement is still infringement.259
Additionally, a split of authority exists regarding standing: the Federal
Circuit has a much higher standard of foreseeability than the Supreme
Court.260 Until the Supreme Court directly addresses this issue, farmers must
254. See Langan, 567 P.2d at 221-23; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519
(1977).
255. See Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350,
1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
256. See Johnson, 817 N.W.2d at 706; see also Wilson, supra note 239, at 184
(clarifying that cross-contamination may support a trespass claim "if the defen-
dant intentionally enters or causes something to enter the land of another").
257. See Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1356, 1361 n.4 (noting that the Su-
preme Court suggested that patent exhaustion would not apply if the infringe-
ment is unintentional (citing Bowman v. Monsanto Co. (Bowman II), 133 S. Ct.
1761, 1769 (2013))).
258. See supra notes 191-196 and accompanying text.
259. See Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1356 (rejecting the Supreme Court's
equitable argument that inadvertent infringement may "not be an infringing
use" (citing Bowman II, 133 S. Ct. at 1769)).
260. Compare Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1360-61 (holding that "trace
amounts" of contamination would not support a justiciable case or contro-
versy), with Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 141 (2010)
(finding that the deregulation of a transgenic crop was sufficiently concrete to
establish an injury-in-fact).
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suffer an injury, such as crop contamination or losing their organic certifica-
tion, before recovering damages in the Federal Circuit. Even if the farmer
suffers an injury, however, the Federal Circuit may continue to be unsympa-
thetic to the plight of the farmer.
All of these issues have a common origin: they have all arisen from the
anatomical and physiological characteristics of plants. While Bowman shed
some light on the applicability of patent exhaustion to transgenic plants, the
Supreme Court must weigh in on inadvertent infringement. Who should bear
the costs of genetic drift? Can farmers recover under tort liability theories?
Until the Supreme Court answers these questions, lower courts will continue
to find in favor of biotechnology companies, such as Monsanto.

